

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION

Information Service

Fact data on international questions for reference use

VOL. II—NO. 15

SEPTEMBER 29, 1926

CONTENTS

	Page
Spain Reopens the Question of Tangier	169
History of International Control of Tangier Zone	170
Preponderant Influence of France, Spain and Britain	172
Dissatisfaction of Local Population in Tangier Zone	173
Origin of French and Spanish Protectorates in Morocco	173
France Eliminates Chief Competitors for Control of Morocco	174
Results of the Algeciras Conference, 1906	175
Development of French Protectorate under Marshal Lyautey	176
The War in the Rif and Franco-Spanish Relations in Morocco	177
Attitude of Powers toward Proposed Tangier Conference	178
Selected List of References	180

Published bi-weekly by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, 18 East 41st St., New York, N. Y. JAMES G. McDONALD, *Chairman*; GEORGE M. LAMONTE, *Treasurer*; CHRISTINA MERRIMAN, *Secretary* Subscription Rates: \$5.00 per year; to F. P. A. Members, \$3.00

The International Problem of Tangier

THE Moroccan question, which in one form or another has repeatedly exercised European statesmen during the last thirty years, was formally reopened on August 25, 1926, when the Spanish Government forwarded to the governments of Great Britain, France, Italy and other signatories of the Act of Algeciras a memorandum asking for alteration of the status of Tangier.

The Spanish memorandum contained a request that Spain be permitted henceforward to administer Tangier, either as an integral part of Spanish Morocco or under a special mandate, thus terminating the international control to which the Tangier zone has been subjected since the latter part of the 19th century. The request serves to precipitate a number of political and economic issues which had sooner or later to be faced by the powers concerned. The settlement of these issues will have immediate effect not only upon the welfare of the inhabitants of Tangier itself but also on the interests of France, Spain, England and Italy, who will be the powers

principally concerned in any conference that may take place.

Each of these four European governments claims to have legitimate and important interests at stake in any alteration of the *status quo* in Tangier. To Great Britain Tangier symbolizes the safety of Mediterranean shipping. The principle enunciated by Nelson, in spite of the recent development of aerial navigation, still holds good: "Tangier must belong to a neutral power; if not, it must become English." Since there is no prospect whatever of its becoming English, Great Britain insists that it shall remain permanently neutralized.

Spain and France, who both hold protectorates in the nominally independent Moroccan Empire, are persuaded that Tangier is the logical adjunct of their own peculiar zones, and each of their governments is mutually persuaded that disaster would result from the acquisition of Tangier by its rival. Spain bases its claim to Tangier on geographical and strategic grounds. Its location causes it to be, it is said, clearly an extension of the Spanish zone. Without effective control over Tangier, Spain can

hardly hope to maintain order in Spanish Morocco, whose dissident chieftains thrive on plots hatched in Tangier and on arms smuggled through from that city. France, on the contrary, denies that Spain possesses a moral right to Tangier. Spain acquired its protectorate in the first place by virtue of an agreement with France whereby the latter "sub-let" to Spain, as it were, the northern section of Morocco. (See below, page ???.) Tangier was specifically reserved at that time for a different form of administrative control. Spain's administration has been so feeble and ineffective in its own protectorate that France could not in any case permit Tangier to be incorporated into the Spanish zone without aggravating the already difficult problem of maintaining order within the French zone itself.

Italy, as a first-class Mediterranean power which is conscious of a pressing need for colonial expansion, is anxious that it should be granted a more important share in the government of Tangier than the existing Tangier Convention allows. It would therefore welcome any opportunity to press its point of view upon the reluctant powers with a view to amending the Tangier Convention which it has hitherto refused to ratify.

All four powers recognize an additional factor operating to enhance the value of Tangier. In time the town should enjoy special economic advantages as a distributing centre for its Moroccan hinterland. Rich mineral deposits of the Rif and Atlas ranges, together with the varied agricultural products of the valleys and plains of Morocco, should find their natural outlet at Tangier, especially after the completion of the Fez-Tangier railroad, now almost ready for commercial use.

These, in rapid survey, are the elements of the situation. Their bearing upon European diplomacy may be more fully appreciated, however, only in the light of the unique story of how international control came to assume the form it has taken in Tangier and in the light of the long series of agreements, conventions and declarations that have punctuated the growth of European, and especially of French influence in Morocco.

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF TANGIER

The Tangier Zone, with which the Spanish Memorandum deals, is a small area of about 200 square miles at the extreme north-west tip of Africa. For two and a half centuries it has nominally been part of the Moroccan Empire, but its geographical and strategic position and the exigencies of domestic and international politics have caused it to pass from the direct control of the Sultan of Morocco to that of an international administration to which the Sultan has been forced to relinquish his rapidly waning authority.

The growth of international control in Tangier was gradual and fortuitous, its results unfortunate. It gave to foreign diplomatic representatives a wide but ill-defined measure of control in the administration of the city, without exacting guarantees that the administration would be effectively carried on.

The city began to assume its international character over a century and a half ago because of regulations issued by the sultans of Morocco to prevent foreign influence from penetrating into the interior of the country. With this end in view they designated Tangier as the residence of European diplomatic representatives. European merchants also congregated there, and the city gradually became not only the diplomatic capital of Morocco, but also a focal point of international activity. Special privileges were sought and obtained by the foreign diplomatic representatives. By a series of agreements known as the Capitulations the Sultan of Morocco conceded to foreigners extraterritorial rights, including exemption from certain forms of taxation, together with the right to be tried in foreign consular courts. Gradually the privileges of foreign representatives in Tangier were extended until they were given the right of participation in local government for the purposes of promoting public health and of safeguarding life and property.

MALADMINISTRATION OF TANGIER

The record of international administration in Tangier has been one of notorious inefficiency. The city, under normal conditions, might be expected to enjoy at least

a moderate prosperity. Commanding as it does the entrance to the Mediterranean, it is the logical distributing centre for sea-going commerce. It has a harbor capable of considerable development, and should profit from the prospect of becoming a terminus of North African if not also of West African railroads. It has an extensive agricultural hinterland. Its climate is healthy. It has a population of 60,000 of whom 10,000 are Europeans, 15,000 Jews and 35,000 Moors.

But with all its natural advantages Tangier has failed to prosper. The native inhabitants have been for the most part poverty-stricken. Up

to the present no hospitals have been established by the authorities for the native population. No effective social legislation has been enacted. No arrangements have been made for public relief of widows, orphans and indigent persons. The water supply has remained scanty and public works have been neglected.

No important industries have been established, and agriculture has been discouraged by the uncertain system of land tenure in vogue. The Budget long remained unbalanced. Irregularities in administration have been notorious. Corruption has been unpunished if not condoned.

The chief causes of this maladministration lay in the fact that:


1. The governing body was accountable for its official acts not to the citizens of Tangier but to a number of more or less distant European governments.
2. Responsibility for the administration of Tangier rested on too many shoulders. With authority divided among the representatives of several powers, none was vested with sufficient power to put vitality into the administration. Any attempt

to do so on the part of one diplomatic representative would have stimulated the jealousy and opposition of others.

THE NEW REGIME UNDER CONVENTION OF 1923

The first serious attempt to evolve a more efficient administration for Tangier was made in 1913, but the war intervened to delay reform. The project was not resumed until 1923, when the Spanish, French and British Governments agreed at Paris upon a Convention regarding the Organization of the Statute of the Tangier Zone. This agreement was ratified in May, 1924, but was not actually put into effect until some months later.

The Tangier Convention gives to the zone a full autonomy under the nominal suzerainty of the Moroccan Sultan. The actual government of Tangier is confided to international groups whose authority varies according to the extent of their interests in the zone. Legislative authority is vested



in an international body, including native Moroccans as well as foreigners. The right of veto is vested in a body composed of foreigners only. The administration is carried on by French, Spanish and British officials. The system is thus not one of international control on a basis of mutual equality. It is based rather on recognition of the special rights of three of the eight nations concerned in the government of Tangier.

The Sultan of Morocco, in accordance with the formula whereby France has recognized the independence of his empire, remains titular ruler over the Tangier zone. He is represented by the Moudoub, his appointed agent, who presides over the Legislative Assembly, promulgates the laws and exercises direct control over the native

Jewish and Mohammedan populations, exacting all dues and taxes required of them.

The principle of equality of economic opportunity for all nations is affirmed. The zone is to be permanently neutral and disarmed.* The Capitulations are abolished, subjects of those nations which have adhered to the 1923 Tangier Convention coming henceforward under the jurisdiction of Mixed Tribunals.† Native Moroccan subjects are justiciable in courts presided over by the Mendoub.

FOREIGN HIERARCHY CREATED

All the signatories of the Act of Algeciras (except Russia, and the Central Powers who were excluded from participation in Moroccan affairs by the Treaty of Versailles) have been given the right to participate in the work of the Tangier legislature. In the Legislative Assembly seats are allotted to the various powers in proportion to their supposed influence in Tangier. Four seats are set apart for French nationals, four for Spanish, three for British, two for Italian, and one each for American,‡ Belgian, Dutch and Portuguese nationals. Members of the Legislative Assembly are nominated by their respective consulates.

There are also on the Assembly nine Moroccan representatives, six of whom are Moslems and six Jews, appointed by the Sultan's representative in Tangier.

The enactments of the Legislative Assembly are subject to veto by the Committee of Control—a body composed of foreign consuls presided over by one of its own number. Here again the foreign powers chiefly interested in Morocco share responsibility. The office of President passes annually from one member of the Committee to another in alphabetical order of the countries represented on it.

The Legislative Assembly and the Council of Control afford the less influential nations a means of modifying, if they choose to do so, but not of directing what is practically a condominium of France, Spain and

Great Britain in Tangier.

Perhaps the outstanding feature of the Tangier Convention is this preponderant influence it has given to France, to Spain and to Great Britain. It was to these three powers that the actual initiative in administration was entrusted. Thus a committee of French, Spanish and British experts drafted the legal codes whereby life in Tangier is now to be regulated. The magistrates of the Mixed Tribunals, which have superseded the former consular courts, are French, Spanish and British nationals. In the Legislative Assembly almost twice as many seats are allotted to these three countries as to all other European countries combined. The three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly are French, Spanish and English. For the first six years the chief administrative officials in Tangier are to be a Frenchman, a Spaniard and an Englishman.

It should not be understood, however, that France, Spain and Great Britain enjoy equal authority in Tangier. Of the three, Great Britain has received the least authority and France the most, while Spain ranks second to France. The chief administrator is a Frenchman. It is this official who is responsible for carrying out the decisions of the Legislative Assembly and for directing the international administration of the zone. The control of foreign affairs is also retained within the exclusive jurisdiction of France, the only exception being in cases where the Tangier authorities may have occasion to negotiate with the resident consuls on questions of merely local concern.

Spain has been associated with France in three special activities not shared by representatives of other powers: France and Spain are together responsible for patrolling the territorial waters of the Tangier zone with a view to checking the contraband traffic in arms and ammunition, French and Spanish officers, under a Belgian captain, are to direct the native Tangier police force; state and municipal public works are always to be in charge of a French and a Spanish engineer respectively.

REFORM UNDER THE TANGIER CONVENTION

The Tangier Convention has been in operation for little over a year. Already,

* Permission is given to Spanish and French troops, however, to cross Tangier territory in case of emergency in Spanish or French Morocco. Such transit is to be completed within a period of forty-eight hours.

† Since the United States and Italy have not yet ratified the Convention, American and Italian nationals are still amenable to the jurisdiction of their respective consular courts in Tangier.

‡ Since neither Italy nor the United States has yet ratified the 1923 Tangier Convention, representatives of these two powers have not yet participated in the work of the Assembly.

however, it has provoked unprecedented activities in the Tangier zone. For example, the native population has been encouraged by it to make an effective protest at last against abuses of long standing in the police administration. Complaints were formally laid before the Mendoub that inoffensive Moroccan citizens were being arrested and tortured by the mixed police to extort confessions of wrongdoing. With two French assistants the Mendoub conducted an investigation which uncovered a series of abuses including robbery, blackmail and other irregular practices. These were found to have been prevalent in the civil police force for many years.

DISSATISFACTION UNDER CONVENTION

In this instance the Tangier Convention has served to promote the interests of the local population. But the statute has been attacked by the inhabitants because it has not gone far enough in this respect. It is alleged that the Legislative Assembly, because it is an appointive and not an elective body, does not function as a medium of expression for the people of the zone. Groups of petitioners do not necessarily have access to its members, who should, it is urged, be responsible to the general body of citizens.

During the past year repeated disturbances have occurred in Tangier, chiefly because of the political dissatisfaction centering about this question of democratic control. There have been recurrent labor strikes and threats of strikes which have hindered commerce and in one case so seriously alarmed the authorities that in the third week of August a British warship was detained in the harbor, French warships were dispatched from Casablanca to Tangier and General Primo de Rivera, the Spanish dictator, proffered the assistance of a detachment of Spanish infantry.

There is, in spite of this unrest, a distinct improvement reported in the conduct of public affairs in Tangier. Although the relief of the six thousand or so refugees from the Rif and Djebala areas has been left entirely to private (largely Anglo-American) effort, the administration itself has improved the sanitary condition of the town. Although loans for public works have been

difficult to raise, noticeable progress has been made in the building of roads. What with these initial encouragements and the progress that has been made on the Tangier-Fez railroad and in the construction of harbor works by a Franco-Belgian company, there begins to appear a hope that the stagnation of the last decade may not be permanent.

ORIGIN OF MOROCCO PROTECTORATES

Should the demands of Spain and the desire of Italy result in the holding of an international conference to discuss once more the status of Tangier, what would be the historical considerations entering into the settlement? On what grounds does France base its present predominance in Tangier? Why does it permit Spain to share so largely in its control? What is the reason for the special status of Great Britain? What has been the relation of Italy to Tangier? These and similar questions receive their answer in an account of what has transpired in Morocco during the last half century.

The heavy losses sustained by France in the war of 1870-71 with Germany impelled the government of the former country to adopt a particularly active colonial policy during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. This was expected not only to have beneficial economic results for France, but still more was it intended to restore the political prestige of France in Europe.

The continent of Africa was at the time in process of being partitioned between European powers—Great Britain, Portugal, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Spain, among whom France assumed such a vigorous role that by 1914 it had acquired colonies and protectorates in Africa aggregating over one third of the entire continent.

The French protectorate in Morocco owes its origin to the previous acquisition by France of the neighboring country of Algeria. In Algeria France had possessed a foothold ever since its occupation in 1830. Gradually, from 1844 onward, French troops came more and more frequently into conflict with Moroccan tribes along the western border of Algeria. This state of things continued until 1901 when an outgrown boundary agreement of 1845 was re-

modelled and more exact definition was given to the prerogatives of frontier tribes.

EUROPEAN RIVALRY IN MOROCCO

The agreement of 1901 was "founded upon respect for the integrity of the Sherifian Empire." It was to prove, however, the precursor of a number of agreements which in the end deprived Morocco of all but the name of independence. For from 1901 until 1912 France was engaged in a diplomatic struggle with rival European powers for the control of Morocco; and from 1912 on, when the pre-eminence of France had been acknowledged by Europe, French military and civil authorities applied themselves to the task of making French occupation effective in the empire of the Sultan.

Great Britain, Germany and Spain were each watching France jealously, for each had ambitions in Morocco and each was anxious to prevent France from acquiring Morocco as an adjunct to Algeria. But the years 1901 to 1912 were to see the successive elimination of all three from the role of rivalry to which they aspired. For by a series of diplomatic negotiations France succeeded during those years in buying off its chief competitors and in establishing its own right to assume a protectorate over the greater part of Morocco.

WITHDRAWAL OF GREAT BRITAIN

Great Britain was the first to retire. After the accession of Edward VII, when the policy of an Anglo-French entente was adopted and measures were taken to settle the traditional rivalries of France and Great Britain in Africa as elsewhere, there came a reversal of British policy in Morocco. In consideration of an undertaking by France not to oppose British influence in Egypt, Great Britain undertook not to oppose French influence in Morocco. (Anglo-French Declaration, April 8, 1904). It furthermore recognized "that it appertains to France, more particularly as a power whose dominions are conterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial and military reforms which it may require."

All nations were to enjoy complete commercial liberty in Morocco. There was to be equality of treatment in respect to customs duties, taxes and transport charges. To safeguard the freedom of the Straits of Gibraltar the Mediterranean coast was to remain unfortified except in the four Spanish "Presidios"—enclaves attached to Spain by virtue of a series of successful military enterprises dating back to the fifteenth century.

By this declaration the claim of France to a protectorate in Morocco was considerably strengthened. But there still remained the aspiration of Spain, based on its successful occupation of Mellila, Alhucemas, Ceuta and Peñan de Velez, and the claims of Germany, now committed to a forward colonial policy in whatever corner of Africa opportunity might offer.

SPAIN PROVIDED WITH SPHERE OF INFLUENCE

Spain was dealt with immediately. On account of the validity of Spanish interests along the northern coast of Morocco, France concluded that the most effective method of securing a free hand for itself in the greater part of the Sherifian Empire would be by designating a clearly defined sphere of influence for Spain in the north. This was done. Such a division had already been foreshadowed in secret clauses of the Anglo-French Declaration of 1904. By a public Franco-Spanish Declaration and the accompanying secret Convention of October 3 in the same year, France transferred to Spain the rights it had acquired by the Anglo-French Declaration insofar as Northern Morocco was concerned. Tangier, however, was to maintain its peculiar international character.

Thus by the end of 1904 both Spain and Great Britain had been induced to renounce interference with the growing power of France in the greater part of Morocco. There now began the diplomatic struggle with Germany to which the latter returned again and again, despite repeated diplomatic defeats, in the hope of overcoming the handicap which its own tardy entry in the race for colonies had imposed upon it.

It so happened that Germany entered upon the scene in Morocco just at a time when the French *chargé d'affaires* was

bringing considerable pressure to bear upon the Sultan to institute reforms in his chaotic and anarchic empire. The Sultan of Morocco himself had sought the intervention of Kaiser Wilhelm II when he had discovered, early in the century, that he could no longer depend on Anglo-French rivalry to ease the burden of foreign pressure at Fez. Germany assumed the position that all powers possessed equal rights with France in Morocco, and encouraged the Sultan to demand an international conference to determine what reforms should be instituted in his dominions. France, weakened by the defeat of its ally, Russia, in the war with Japan, had to accede, much against its will, to the proposal for an international conference.

GERMANY AND THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE

The conference met at Algeciras in 1906, Germany determined to reduce French privileges in Morocco, and France determined to maintain the *status quo*. The result was a compromise in which, however, Germany gained less than it had hoped for. France had to submit to the conference its plans for reorganizing the administration of public works, taxes and customs in Morocco, but on the other hand it retained the right to negotiate directly with the Sultan in the matter of organizing police forces and providing for prevention of contraband trade in arms and ammunition.

The Act of Algeciras (April 7, 1906) was signed by Great Britain, Germany, Spain, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Sweden, Belgium, Portugal, Italy and the United States. It enunciated the triple principle of the sovereignty and independence of the Sultan, the integrity of his state and equal treatment of foreign nations in economic matters. In effect, its provisions allowed France to retain the upper hand in the French zone of Morocco, for not only was France given a preponderant share in the capital of the newly established Moroccan State Bank, but its power over Moroccan police left it in a position of unique influence.

The Act of Algeciras was not many months old, however, before Germany renewed the diplomatic attack on France. It so happened that Sultan Abdul Aziz, un-

able to establish his authority in more than a fractional part of Morocco, was attacked by his brother, Moulay Hafid, who ultimately overthrew him and reigned in his stead (1908-12). During the period of civil war French troops had been operating in the vicinity of Casablanca. The German government took exception to this situation and demanded satisfaction. It failed to carry its point, however, for by the Franco-German Declaration of February 9, 1909 Germany undertook to pursue only economic interests in Morocco and was forced to recognize the special political rights of France, especially with regard to the consolidation of order.

THE END OF GERMAN RIVALRY

A third and final Franco-German crisis developed only two years later. Sultan Moulay Hafid had found the task of imposing his rule on Morocco too great for him. Besieged by tribesmen in his capital at Fez, he finally appealed to France for aid, which was willingly furnished. Germany's retort to the French military occupation of Fez was to dispatch a warship to Agadir, ostensibly to protect German mining interests. But it was generally understood that the move was in reality a demand for transfer to Germany of a sphere of influence in Morocco similar to that possessed by Spain.

The situation became grave. Germany did not intend to withdraw until the French troops left Fez. Great Britain rallied to the support of France. War seemed about to ensue.

Once more, however, the question was settled without resort to arms. France ceded to Germany two colonial areas in the Ubanghi and Cameroon regions, in Central Africa, and in return received a specific promise that Germany would not oppose the establishment of a French protectorate over Morocco, and that France should have a free hand in establishing reforms and in extending its control throughout the Empire. Once more the principle of the economic "open door" was affirmed.

FRANCE AND SPAIN ASSUME PROTECTORATES

This agreement effectively eliminated German rivalry. It remained for France only to establish its protectorate by formal

negotiations with the Sultan of Morocco himself. This was done on March 30, 1912.

By the Franco-Moroccan Treaty of that date it was agreed that there should be instituted in Morocco a new régime comprising such administrative, judicial, educational, economic, financial and military reforms as the French Government thought wise to introduce. The French Government would protect the person and throne of the Sultan and guarantee the integrity of his dominions. France would control the foreign relations of Morocco. It would have the right also to proceed to any military occupation of Moroccan territory necessary to the preservation of order. Tangier, however, was to retain its special international status.

No corresponding agreement was drawn up between Spain and Morocco establishing a Spanish protectorate in Northern Morocco. That purpose was served, however, by a Franco-Spanish convention (November 27, 1912) whereby the French Government recognized that in the zone of Spanish influence established by the 1904 Declaration it pertained to Spain to preserve order and to assist the Moroccan government in introducing such administrative, economic, financial, judicial and military reforms as were necessary. A Spanish High Commissioner was to advise the Khalifa, the representative of the Sultan of Morocco residing in Tetuan. Provisions were renewed for safeguarding the freedom of the Straits, for guaranteeing the economic "open door" and for continuing the international régime in Tangier.

Thus, by successive diplomatic manoeuvres France established its own position in Morocco and that of Spain, delegating to the latter power such rights and privileges in northern Morocco as it had gradually won for itself in the southern zone.

ORGANIZATION OF FRENCH AND SPANISH ZONES

Thanks to the tact and organizing genius of Marshal Lyautey, who was sent to Morocco as Resident-General in 1912, a remarkable development of the country ensued—a development unique in the annals of African exploitation. The country was in a state of disintegration when the protectorate was proclaimed, and the numer-

ous tribes inhabiting it proved to be no more desirous of submitting to French control than they had been amenable to the rule of Moulay Hafid or his predecessor Abdul Aziz. The policy Marshal Lyautey adopted was that of occupying and pacifying the easier districts first, establishing a sound administration and furnishing adequate military protection before extending the field of his activities. Outposts were pushed forward into unoccupied areas only as appropriate opportunities offered.

EXTENSION OF FRENCH AUTHORITY

In this manner the authority of the central government, which had originally been effective over only 88 thousand square kilometers was extended so as to include by 1917 about 235 thousand square kilometers. The Sultan's dominions had never been so well organized or so prosperous. Although crops were none too good in 1912 and 1913 the European population in those years increased from 6,000 to 26,000. In about the same period (1911-1913) the value of imports increased from 69 million francs to 181 million francs. Excellent medical, sanitary and veterinary services were established. The number of schools and students increased rapidly. Roads, bridges, culverts, and port facilities were constructed; telephone and telegraph systems were installed. Agriculture and stock-raising have been encouraged, together with new projects, such as phosphate mining, that promise good returns. Between 1921 and 1924 the number of European industrial enterprises increased from 268 to 615. A comprehensive hydroelectric project is on foot which when actually established will enable a still more rapid industrial development of the country.

The area of effective occupation in French Morocco is still, however, less than half of what is nominally included in the French protectorate. This fact is due in part to the severe check which the nationalist uprising under Abd-el-Krim constituted—an uprising which spread from the Spanish zone into the French zone and interrupted the French program of consolidation and

While Marshal Lyautey was organizing the French zone, Spanish military forces were attempting to pacify Northern Mor-

occo. Here again the country was divided among numerous tribes, reluctant to submit to a central authority. Attempts were made to establish an effective occupation throughout the zone but from time to time the Spanish troops were forced to withdraw from advanced positions. Disorders were prevalent. The resulting economic condition is described in the following manner in an official British survey of industrial and economic conditions in Morocco for 1923-24:

"The trade and commerce of the country are still in a very undeveloped and unsatisfactory state. It is true that possibilities are at best restricted, but little or nothing has been done to develop available resources, while in some instances existing industries have fallen off in production or even ceased to exist. There are, indeed, no organized industries in existence at present, and when it is added that the agricultural produce of the country is for the moment insufficient for its own needs, and that its potential mineral wealth has been exploited only on a small scale, it will be readily understood that its exports are insignificant. Were it not for the presence of a Spanish army of occupation it is difficult to see, indeed, whence the inhabitants would obtain the wherewithal to purchase foreign products other than those of prime necessity, such as candles. As things are, however, Spanish Morocco lives on Spain and has no separate economic existence. Her wealth, enabling her inhabitants to purchase foreign manufactures, is derived, as to more than 99 per cent, from the Peninsula, in the shape of army pay, spent of necessity in the Protectorate, military disbursements for the manifold services of the army, political disbursements, and similar heads of expenditure. . . . The large export trade formerly done by Tetuan in fruit of all kinds, for which it was famed, has now entirely disappeared, and fruit is now even imported from Spain. The damage done to the trees at the time of the occupation in 1913, the lack of security in the vicinity of the orchards, and the consequent discouragement of the native owners, account for this state of affairs. . . ."

It is added that the general state of insecurity makes grazing unprofitable in most districts, since it is only in the vicinity of the towns that cattle can be pastured without fear of robbery.

The economic future of the country depends upon its mineral deposits. Only a small beginning has been made in development of mineral wealth as yet, largely on account of the prevailing disturbances.

During the last seventeen years Spain has spent over 40,000 lives in the Spanish zone, and about five billion pesetas;* in return

it has reaped negligible benefits, either economic or political. For the last five years it has been engaged in combating a vigorous rebellion of serious proportions, and although the back of the resistance was broken in May 1926, the aftermath of tribal warfare has continued to keep the zone in a state of disturbance.

THE WAR IN THE RIF

The rebellion led by Abd-el-Krim (1921-26) was a protest against foreign occupation of the Rif, the mountainous area occupying the eastern section of the Spanish zone, and an attempt to establish the independence of that region. Beginning with relatively few supporters, the chief of the Beni Ourriaghel tribe succeeded by various means in drawing tribe after tribe into the struggle. The fortunes of the rebels varied, but by 1924 they had inflicted a considerable defeat on Spain and stirred to revolt some of the tribes living across the border in French Morocco.

At this juncture, since the war in the Rif had become a menace to the Taza and Fez regions in its own zone, France came to the assistance of Spain. France was deeply concerned. Continuance of the Rifian war meant danger of a general uprising in Morocco. It menaced communications between Morocco and Algeria. Most serious of all, it compromised the prestige of France throughout Africa and in Moslem eyes the world over.

In spite of French participation in the war, the successes of Abd-el-Krim continued. The tide did not turn until late in 1925. There was an abortive peace parley in April 1926, during which the principle of autonomy for the Rif was conceded by Spain and France; but because this principle was interpreted in such opposite senses by Europeans and Riffians respectively that there could be no prospect of agreement, the conference broke up without accomplishing its purpose, and the war was resumed.

The final surrender of Abd-el-Krim to the French army and the collapse of the Riffian forces followed not long afterwards (May 1926). Abd-el-Krim was exiled to Madagascar, and Franco-Spanish conversa-

* The peseta is normally equivalent to 19 cents.

tions were held with a view to safeguarding the Franco-Spanish frontier in Morocco, disarming the rebel tribes, and ensuring equality of treatment for tribes with respect to organization of the native administration, taxation, and regulations governing traffic in arms.

FRANCO-SPANISH RELATIONS IN MOROCCO

Relieved though Spain and France undoubtedly were at the outcome of the protracted rebellion, its conclusion left them face to face with other issues of a delicate and difficult nature involving their own mutual relations. Was Spain obligated to maintain order in the whole of the zone transferred to it by the Franco-Spanish agreements of 1904 and 1912? France, which had suffered heavy losses through the disorders in the Spanish zone, maintained that this was the case. Spain, on the contrary, was of the opinion that the 1912 convention made permissive rather than obligatory Spanish occupation of the entire zone.

In support of the French thesis it will be recalled that the French government had undertaken in the Franco-Moroccan Treaty of 1912 to preserve the integrity of the Moroccan Empire. This obligation to the Moroccan Sultan was transferred to Spain, insofar as the Spanish zone was concerned, by the Spanish Convention of 1912. The Riffian rebellion, which originated in tribal disorders, was theoretically a revolt against the Moroccan Sultan, whose authority Abdel-Krim defied. In permitting a situation to develop which had imperilled the unity of the Sultan's dominions, Spain had failed, it may be said, to carry out the letter as well as the spirit of its agreement with France.

In support of the Spanish view of the case it may be pointed out, on the other hand, that France itself had not succeeded before the rebellion in occupying effectively the whole of its own zone. If France found effective occupation impossible might not Spain be absolved from the obligation of keeping garrisons in the more remote and turbulent sections of Northern Morocco?

The fundamental difficulty confronting France and Spain is obvious. It is found in the fact that two nations who are es-

entially rivals are trying to share with each other the control of an undeveloped country on which both, for strategic reasons, consider it expedient to maintain a hold. To carry on the administration of the two separate zones with a moderate degree of mutual toleration would be difficult under the best of circumstances. And in this case the irritations inherent in division of authority have been intensified by the inequality in French and Spanish achievements. Moreover, the situation is complicated by the existence of the Tangier zone, where French and Spanish officials not only have to cooperate with each other in the daily routine of administration, but where they have to share the majority of their responsibilities with representatives of other nations. The situation offers every opportunity for mutual irritations.

THE PROPOSED TANGIER CONFERENCE

What is to be done to meet the difficulty?

Spain's desires have frequently been expressed. "The event has shown the truth of what has always been obvious to me," declared an ex-Prime Minister of Spain in 1915, "—that with an internationalized zone, or an anarchic one, as I might rather say, . . . Spain could never perform its mission in its own zone. All that Spain does will be valueless if Tangier is to remain under this uncertain and unfortunate administration."

This was the point of view which inspired the recent Spanish memorandum addressed to the powers signatory to the Act of Algeciras. The memorandum is understood, according to unofficial press reports, to have made the following statements and suggestions:

1. In order to provide a satisfactory and permanent settlement of the Tangier question, the zone of Tangier should be incorporated in the Spanish zone of Morocco, under conditions guaranteeing the continued freedom of the Straits of Gibraltar.
2. Failing incorporation of Tangier into the Spanish zone of Morocco, Spain would apply for a mandate over the Tangier zone.*
3. Spain took this attitude largely because it was impossible to preserve order in Spanish Morocco so long as the *status quo* was maintained in Tangier. It was nationalist propaganda and the contraband trade in arms centering in Tangier, for instance, that had been largely responsible

for prolongation of the Rifian war. The decline in Tangier trade was also due to the régime established by the Tangier Convention. The preponderance of French control in Tangier, moreover, was unfair.

4. A convenient occasion for discussing the Tangier question might be found at Geneva prior to or during the September session of the League Assembly. It was hinted that Spain might link its request for jurisdiction over Tangier with a request to the League of Nations for a permanent seat on the Council, to be allotted to Spain at the forthcoming reorganization of that body.

FRENCH VIEW OF THE SPANISH MEMORANDUM

To the specific points raised in the Spanish memorandum the French government made the following specific replies:

1. During the Rifian war there was more trade in contraband arms and ammunition along the Rifian coast, which was supposedly under Spanish surveillance, than went on in Tangier, under international control.
2. The decline in Tangier trade was due primarily not to the operation of the Tangier Convention but to the Rifian war which shut Tangier off from its natural hinterland. World trade conditions had also contributed largely to the depression in Tangier.
3. If France was given a preponderant influence in Tangier it was only natural, since the French element in Tangier, though smaller numerically than the Spanish, controlled a greater share of its economic activities.

France refused to consider resorting to the League of Nations to secure a mandate for Spain in Tangier. Since Tangier was part of the empire of the Sultan of Morocco, an independent sovereign, the League of Nations had not the right to convert it into a mandated territory, in the view of French officials. The League, they intimated, had no jurisdiction in the matter whatsoever.

The French reply, as a matter of fact, indicated that little support would be given from Paris to any proposal involving a radical change in the administration of Tangier. It was suggested, however, that a slight adjustment might be made in Spain's favor which would have the effect Spain chiefly desired to produce. For instance, France would consider allotting to Spanish officials certain key positions now occupied

by nationals of other countries. If the captain of the Tangier police were a Spaniard instead of a Belgian as at present, the Spanish authorities would have full opportunity to suppress the nationalist propaganda and contraband trade against which the memorandum had especially complained.

BRITISH VIEW OF THE SPANISH MEMORANDUM

The reply addressed to Spain by Great Britain supported the French position in the main. There could be no question, it stated, of incorporating Tangier into the Spanish zone. But the British Government would be willing to discuss with the governments of France and Spain conditions upon which the accession of the powers who had not yet accepted the Tangier Convention (Italy and the United States) might be obtained. In the course of such discussions it would be open to Italy to advance its views and wishes with due regard to existing treaties and agreements. These discussions the British note added, would be preliminary to discussions with other powers.

It was intimated in the British note that no such discussion should take place, however, until after the close of the September meeting of the League Assembly.

Three things were made evident by the British reply:

1. That Great Britain still relied on the internationalization and neutralization of Tangier as the best attainable guarantee of the freedom of the Straits.
2. That it refused to permit Spain to link its Tangier demands with the entirely unrelated claim for a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations.
3. That it would attempt to exclude Italy from all preliminary discussions looking toward a modification in the administration of the Tangier zone.

ITALY AND TANGIER

Italy's reply to the Spanish memorandum supported the proposal for an international conference to consider the status of Tangier. It assumed the position that the problem should be settled without reference to the League of Nations—which had no jurisdiction over Tangier. The question should rather be submitted to representatives of the countries signatory to the Act of Algeciras (including Italy). Italy undertook to use

* The powers to whom the memorandum was addressed understood this to refer to a mandate under League of Nations auspices. In a subsequent official note, however, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs explained that the Spanish Government had never contemplated receiving a mandate from the League of Nations over Tangier.

its influence to conciliate the opposing interests of the powers in order to secure a solution favorable to Spain's demands which it regarded as being just.

There was apparent in Italy's reply a two-fold motivation. In the first place there was an evident eagerness for a conference at which Italy might put forward its oft-reiterated proposal for revision of the Tangier Convention with a view to securing for itself a degree of authority in the Tangier zone comparable to that of Great Britain, if not even to that of Spain or France. Secondly, and alternatively, Italy was moved by its friendship for Spain, cemented by the treaty of August 7, 1926, to support a proposal which might be counted upon to strengthen its firmest ally at the expense of its opponents, Great Britain and France.*

It had hitherto been the policy of the latter nation to exclude Italy, whenever possible, from formal conferences on Tangier. At the time of the Paris Conference of 1923, when the Tangier Convention was in process of preparation, Italy wished to participate, but was excluded by the action of France. Again in June 1926, during the Franco-Spanish conversations following upon the collapse of Abd-el-Krim's army, France made every attempt to maintain informality in the proceedings and to avoid topics which might entrench upon existing international agreements, because it wished to prevent Italy from succeeding in the at-

tempt to find a valid excuse for summoning an international conference. Finally, in the matter of the Spanish memorandum it soon became evident that neither France nor England were pleased at the prospect of an international conference in which Italy would appear on terms of equality with themselves. This was the reason for the proposal that a full conference of all the powers concerned be held only after France, Spain and Great Britain had arrived at an agreement among themselves.†

Should the Spanish memorandum result in a shifting of equilibrium in Tangier, the forces which will operate to effect that readjustment will be for the most part those enumerated above. In Tangier itself one section of the population has petitioned for a mandate under the League of Nations, but that proposal appears not to be within the realm of practical politics. Another section of the population has declared against the cession of Tangier to Spain; but here again, little practical importance is attached to the demonstration of public opinion; for so deep-seated are the national rivalries centered in Tangier that it is apparent that the relative diplomatic strength of the European nations engaged in the forthcoming negotiations will decide the issue, rather than the wishes of the inhabitants themselves, who support widely divergent policies.

† The Anglo-French attitude as expressed in the replies received in Madrid to the memorandum of August 25 caused the Spanish Government to alter its policy. On September 18 a second note was dispatched to Paris and London, in which it was proposed that France, Great Britain and Spain meet in a preliminary conference to discuss the admission of Italy to participation in the Tangier condominium. The former proposal for annexation of Tangier to the Spanish zone was dropped entirely.

* The situation was further complicated when Russia announced on August 31 that, as a signatory of the Act of Algéiras, it would refuse to recognize any alteration in the status of Tangier to which it had not given previous consent.

SELECTED LIST OF REFERENCES

American Journal of International Law, Texts of Agreements, Declarations and Conventions in Supplements to Vols. VI and VII.

Bernard, Général, "La Géographie," November, 1920: *La conquête et l'organisation du Maroc*.

Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique française.
Dupuy, Emile: *Comment nous avons conquis le Maroc—1845-1912*.

"Foreign Affairs," London, August, 1926: *The International Problem of Tangier*, by W. F. S.

Great Britain, Department of Overseas Trade: *Moroccan Reports, 1923-24 and 1924-25*.

Great Britain, Foreign Office: *Peace Handbooks*, No. 89—*Partition of Africa* and No. 101—*French Morocco*. No. 122—*Spanish Morocco*.

Great Britain, Foreign Office. (Morocco, No. 1, 1924.) *Convention Regarding the Organization of the Statute of the Tangier Zone*.

Harris, Walter B.: "Foreign Affairs," New York, July, 1925. *"The Three Moroccos."*

Millet, René Philippe: *La Conquête du Maroc*.

Morel, E. D.: *Ten years of Secret Diplomacy*.

Moreno, Servando: *La dominación de España en Tánger*.

Nobili, Massuero F.: *Tangeri, l'Italia e il Mediterraneo*. Politica. Vol. 18, pp. 79-92.

Piquet, Victor: *La colonisation française dans l'Afrique du nord: Algérie—Tunisie—Maroc*.

Tardieu, André: *Le mystère d'Agadir* (1912). *La conférence d'Algéiras*.